In the final days of the Libyan civil war in late 2011, the town of Sirte became the central battleground. This town, with a population of around 100,000, faced an incessant barrage of artillery and streetto-street fighting on the ground and bombardment from the air as a combination of Libyan rebels and NATO air power attempted to wipe out any remaining resistance to the rebellion. The impact on the population of this city was massive. Tens of thousands fled as the siege intensified between August and October, with shortages of food, water and medical supplies affecting the entire population of the city. Most recent estimates suggest that one third of the population has still not returned. The numbers of civilians that were killed or wounded during the siege appear to be unknown and the fate of Sirte (and to a certain extent Libya as a whole) and its residents no longer figures in global news stories.
I will return to some accounts and images of the siege of Sirte below, suffice it to say at this point that the issue at stake in relation to this event is the role played by NATO and the corresponding effects this may have for our understanding of the responsibility to protect (RtoP). Advocates for the RtoP were among the most strident supporters of military intervention in Libya in early 2011 and many have subsequently suggested that the removal of the Gaddafi regime represents a success in terms of advancing the RtoP norm. In this context, the NATO participation in the siege of Sirte is troubling. Given that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate was couched in terms of 'human protection', how can participation in a siege that led to the death and displacement of thousands of civilians from Sirte be justified? This question leads us toward the problem of political neutrality in humanitarian discourse, particularly in instances where force is employed for ostensibly humanitarian purposes. Can it really be maintained that the RtoP norm is solely about the protection of human life and is not attached to any particular political or ideological purpose? And if we argue, as Michael Ignatieff (2004) has done, that in situations of intense civil conflict we need to think in terms of 'lesser evils' and accept that the price of protection for some may be the death or displacement of others, how are these calculations made and accounted for in RtoP thought?
In addressing these questions, this account of the Libyan crisis will begin with a definition of the political. Here, I will specifically focus on Schmitt's Concept of the Political, which presents political activity in terms of a friend/enemy distinction that maintains 'the ever present possibility of combat ' (Schmitt 1996a, p. 32 ). I will then show, by reference to the RtoP in relation to the Libyan crisis, that the use of force for 'human protection purposes' relies on an intensely political definition of 'the human' in which the real possibility of killing and forced displacement necessarily remains. This problem will be illustrated with particular reference to the siege of Sirte. Finally, I will argue that the divisive politics of any intervention that takes place under the RtoP negates the purported universalism of the doctrine and suggests instead that there is necessarily a political and ideological lens through which friends and enemies are distinguished when military interventions for human protection purposes are being considered and waged. This, I will suggest, is the inevitable product of a doctrine that seeks to deal with the problem of sovereignty by asserting that it is purely normative and can be transformed through creative redefinition. It is precisely the denial of the relevance of power in RtoP theory that leads to a situation where the consequences of the irresponsible exercise of lethal power in 'real-world' crises cannot be fully acknowledged and where potential strategies for intervention that may result in more effective 'human protection' are overlooked.
Defining 'the political'
Any attempt to demonstrate the political nature of the RtoP must first address the difficult question of the definition of 'the political'. As indicated in the introduction, this chapter, while maintaining an awareness of the contested and controversial nature of Schmitt's contributions to legal and political theory, will focus upon the definition he put forward in The Concept of the Political, which aimed to transcend problematically circular definitions of politics and the state (Schmitt 1996a, pp. 20-22) .
